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THE CHECKING VALUE OF THE
INDEPENDENT AMERICAN LAWYER: AN
ESSAY IN HONOR OF IRA J. KURZBAN*
BRUCE J. WINICK**
In a recent conference held at the University of Miami School
of Law, Professor Irwin Stotzky brought together an impressive
group of international scholars, jurists, government officials, and
attorneys to ruminate on the subject of "Transition to Democracy
in Latin America: The 'Role of the Judiciary." In a series of sepa-
rately focused sessions, these distinguished panelists discussed
such subjects as "The Independence of the Judiciary," "The Judi-
cial Process: The Trial," "The Role of the Prosecutor," and "Judi-
cial Review and Remedies." The courts, of course, play a crucial
role in a democratic society. As Tocqueville showed more than a
century ago, the courts play an especially significant role in Ameri-
can democracy.1
Because the American model of democracy is so highly re-
garded throughout the world, the role of American courts in ex-
panding and protecting democratic principles is of special interest
to any student of the transition to democracy. Yet, though the con-
ference analyzed in detail the roles of the judiciary and of the pros-
ecutor, it omitted one crucial area of the judicial process that
makes American democracy so unique. That unexamined area is
the crucial role played by the independent American lawyer acting
as a significant check against governmental abuses.
The "checking value" 2 of the independent lawyer in America
is deeply imbedded in our history and traditions, going back to co-
lonial times. By challenging governmental action in courts, both in
the representation of civil plaintiffs and in the defense of those
accused of crimes, the independent American lawyer has made the
* Copyright 1992 by Bruce J. Winick
* Professor of Law, University of Miami, School of Law.
1. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (1862).
2. See Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B.
FOUND. RES. J. 521 (discussing the role of free speech as a restraint on the abuse of govern-
mental power).
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courtroom in America an important public forum for the discus-
sion and dramatization of ideas and, consequently, an important
forum for political expression and action.' Indeed, the political
trial has always been part of our history.
Certainly the most celebrated political trial of the colonial era,
and one that laid the foundation for the role of the independent
attorney in challenging governmental abuses, was the 1735 trial of
John Peters Zenger, the New York printer charged with seditious
libel for publishing newspaper articles criticizing the colonial gov-
ernor.5 Two leading New York lawyers, James Alexander and Wil-
liam Smith, came to Zenger's defense. When the lawyers chal-
lenged the fairness of the presiding judge, who had been appointed
by the governor who was the subject of Zenger's sharp criticism,
the judge responded by disbarring them. When Zenger, who was
3. See OTTO KIRCHHEIMER, POLITICAL JUSTICE: THE USE OF LEGAL PROCEDURE FOR PO-
LITICAL ENDS 47 (1961) ("Throughout the modern era, whatever the dominant legal system,
both governments and private groups have tried to enlist the support of the courts for
Change upholding or shifting the balance of political power."); Jack Greenberg, Litigationfor Social Change: Methods, Limits and Role in Democracy, 29 REc. A.B. CITY N.Y. 320, 320(1974) ("In recent decades courts have caused or helped to generate much of the important
social change in America."); David J. Rothman, The Courts and Social Reform: A Post-
progressive Outlook, 6 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 113 (1982) ("the judiciary has become a forum
in which attorneys have pressed for social change").
4. See Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 352 (1970) (Douglas, J., concurring) ("[P]olitical
trials. . . frequently recur in our history .. "); KIRCHHEIMER, supra note 3, at 47 ("Politi-
cal trials are inescapable."); JOHN M. SINK, POLITICAL CRIMINAL TRIALS: HOW TO DEFEND
THEM vii (1974) ("[P]olitical trials are an [sic] historical constant of Anglo-American law.");
Michal R. Belknap, Introduction: Political Trials in the American Past, in AMERICAN PO-
LITICAL TRIALS 3 (Michal R. Belknap ed., 1981) ("Throughout United States history, from
pre-Revolutionary time to the post-Vietnam era, war, economic conflict, racial and ethic
tensions, fundamental disagreements about the organization of government, and occasion-
ally even simple partisan competition for office have spawned political trials.") (footnotes
omitted). See generally AMERICAN POLITICAL TRIALS (Michal R. Belknap ed., 1981)(collec-
tion of essays on the role of political trials in American history); NORMAN DORSEN & LEON
FRIEDMAN, DISORDER IN THE COURT 72-89 (1974) (analyzing disruptive and disorderly politi-
cal trials); KIRCHHEIMER, supra note 3 (analyzing the difference between a typical criminal
trial and a political trial); POLITICAL TRIALS (Theodore Lewis Becker ed., 1971)(survey of
notable political trials); Leon Friedman, Political Power and Legal Legitimacy: A Short
History of Political Trials, 30 ANTIOCH REV. 157 (1970) (discussing the trials of uncommon
criminals); Nathan Hakman, Political Trials in the Legal Order: A Political Scientist's Per-
spective, 21 J. PUB. L. 73 (1972) (explaining trials in terms of the political, social and eco-
nomic interests involved).
5. See, e.g., JAMES ALEXANDER, A BRIEF NARRATIVE OF THE CASE AND TRIAL OF JOHN
PETER ZENGER, PRINTER OF THE NEW YORK WEEKLY JOURNAL (Stanley Nider Katz 2d ed.,
1972); Paul Finkelman, The Zenger Case: Prototype of a Political Trial, in AMERICAN Po-
LITIcAL TRIALS 21 (Michal R. Belknap ed., 1981); Bruce J. Winick, Forfeiture of Attorneys'
Fees Under RICO and CCE and the Right to Counsel of Choice: The Constitutional Di-
lemma and How to Avoid It, 43 U. MIAMI L. REV. 765, 790-98 (1989).
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without funds, petitioned the court for appointment of counsel, the
judge obliged him by appointing a young lawyer who was a mem-
ber of the governor's faction.
At the trial, Andrew Hamilton, a distinguished attorney from
the neighboring colony of Pennsylvania and reputedly the best
trial lawyer in North America, came forward to take over the rep-
resentation of Zenger. Hamilton made an impassioned plea to the
jury in support of the liberty to expose and oppose tyranny by
speaking and writing the truth. English common law did not then
recognize truth as a defense to seditious libel, and the judge so
instructed the jury. Hamilton's closing argument, however, invited
jury nullification. The New York jury, striking a blow for colonial
self-government and freedom from despotic rulers, rebuffed the
court and acquitted the young printer. While advocating for John
Peter Zenger in a colonial New York courtroom, Andrew Hamilton
advanced ideas that reverberated throughout the colonies and
planted the seeds of revolution and of the new order.
Hamilton's efforts began a tradition for the independent bar
- acting as a significant check against the abuse of governmental
power and as an institutional safeguard against injustice. When
Judge Henry R. Selden argued that the then recently adopted
Fourteenth Amendment protected the right of women to vote in
his defense of Susan B. Anthony during her 1873 prosecution for
voting in a federal election, he carried out this tradition. Selden's
advocacy on behalf of Anthony, in a test case that challenged sex-
ual discrimination and dramatized the women's suffrage move-
ment, "arrested the attention of legal minds as no popular discus-
sion had done. ' '7
Few attorneys more exemplify the private lawyer fighting
against injustice than Clarence Darrow. Darrow used the pulpit of
6. See Finkelman, supra note 5, at 80-82; Winick, supra note 5, at 796-98.
7. 2 HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE 691 (Susan B. Anthony et al. eds., 1882 & photo
reprint 1985). The trial of Susan B. Anthony "was in many ways advantageous to the cause
of freedom. Her trial served to awaken thought, promote discussion, and complete investiga-
tion of the principles of government." Id. The book narrates the trial with commentary by
Ms. Anthony, Elizabeth Cady Stanton, and Matilda Joslyn Gage. Id. at 647-91. Anthony,
with the aid of several Rochester, New York election officials, had registered and voted in
open defiance of the law in order to set up a test case and "to use her trial as a political
forum." Belknap, supra note 4, at 7, 101. The constitutional challenge to the denial of
women's right to vote was rejected by the Supreme Court of the United States in another
case. Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162 (1874). Women were denied the right to
vote until 1920, when the nineteenth amendment was adopted. U.S. CONST. amend. XIX.
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the courtroom to dramatize the plight of labor in its battle to
unionize the railroads in his representation of Eugene V. Debs,
who had been charged with criminal conspiracy in 1895.8 Darrow
championed academic freedom over religious dogma in his attack
on the Tennessee law forbidding the teaching of evolution on be-
half of Biology teacher John Thomas Scopes in the 1925 Dayton,
Tennessee "monkey trial."" Darrow also plead for an end to capital
punishment in his stirring closing argument in the trial of Leopold
and Loeb for the 1924 "thrill killing" of little Bobby Franks. 0 Dar-
row's advocacy in these cases sparked a public dialogue about con-
troversial issues and demonstrated the First Amendment value of
the independent American lawyer.
When Thurgood Marshall and Constance Baker Motley led
the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund's historic march
from Plessy to Brown," they acted in this tradition. Their efforts
succeeded in placing an important check on the ability of local
8. United States v. Debs, 63 F. 436 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1894); see Daniel Novak, The Pull-
man Strike Cases: Debs, Darrow and the Labor Injunction, in AMERICAN POLITICAL TRIALS
129 (Michal R. Belknap ed., 1981). The criminal trial was aborted when a juror fell ill; Debs
was not re-prosecuted. Id. at 131. Darrow's strategy of putting George Pullman and the
railroad association on trial worked, but the victory was short-lived. Convinced their efforts
would not succeed before a jury, the railroads shifted to a new tool, the labor injunction -
equitable relief to be granted by the court, thereby avoiding jury trial. See id. at 147-48.
9. See Scopes v. State, 154 Tenn. 105, 289 S.W. 363 (1927) (reversing conviction on
state law grounds); ARTHUR G. HAYS, LET FREEDOM RING 26 (1925 & repr. ed. 1972); Bel-
knap, supra note 4, at 9. For a novelistic account of the case, later made into a popular film,
see JEROME LAWRENCE & ROBERT E. LEE, INHERIT THE WIND (1955). Such limits on what can
be taught in the public schools were later held unconstitutional under the Establishment
Clause. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1978); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968);
Daniel v. Waters, 515 F.2d 485 (5th Cir. 1975).
10. See JOHN KAPLAN, CRIMINAL JUSTICE: INTRODUCTORY CASES AND MATERIALS 12-15
(1973); IRVING STONE, CLARENCE DARROW FOR THE DEFENSE 414-17 (1941); CLARENCE DAR-
ROW, ATTORNEY FOR THE DAMNED (Arthur Wienberg ed., 1957). The two defendants received
life imprisonment, rather than the death penalty. KAPLAN, supra, at 12 n.t. Although Loeb
died in prison several years later, Leopold was paroled after thirty-one years. Id. He became
a social worker and is cited frequently as both an example of the possibility of redemption
for capital defendants and proof of the merits of Darrow's argument. Id. For a novelistic
account of the trial, later made into a popular film, see MEYER LEVIN, COMPULSION (1956).
11. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) invalidated segregation in public
schools, overruling, Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), which had legitimated racial
segregation through the separate but equal doctrine. Plessy was a test case on the part of a
civil rights organization in New Orleans to attack the constitutionality of the Jim Crow laws
then spreading throughout the South. See Greenberg, supra note 3, at 323-26. Richard
Kluger tells the story of the long effort to overrule Plessy with great insight and feeling in
RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN v. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND
BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY (1976). Thurgood Marshall's role as a lawyer
functioning as a check on government abuse continued during his tenure as an Associate
Justice of the Supreme Court.
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school boards to reinforce and perpetuate racial discrimination and
in ending the system of legal segregation that had replaced slavery.
When segregation in privately-operated public accommoda-
tions and housing continued to perpetuate our bitter legacy of race
prejudice, often under the protection of local law, private lawyers
came forward to meet the challenge. In the 1960s civil rights activ-
ists found the ordinary political process closed to them and re-
sorted to such protest techniques as the "sit-in" demonstration to
attack discrimination and press their constitutional claims. Civil
rights lawyers from the North and other parts of the country pro-
vided representation when members of the local bars in the South-
ern states would not do so. These lawyers stood at their side, and
their efforts helped to overcome this vestige of slavery, prodding
passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.12 The success of the civil
rights movement in effecting legal change sparked similar legal ef-
forts to extend constitutional rights to other disadvantaged groups,
such as criminal defendants, juveniles, children, illegitimates,
aliens, women, the mentally disabled, and the poor.1"
The role of the independent lawyer in challenging the govern-
ment when it is wrong, often in the face of intense popular support
for its actions, requires a degree of skill, courage, and stamina that
provides the greatest possible test of any lawyer's character and
intelligence. Such lawyers are rare. While many pursue wealth or
12. See Leon Friedman, Introduction to SOUTHERN JUSTICE 5-6 (Leon Friedman ed.,
Meridian Books 1967); JACK GREENBERG, JUDICIAL PROCESS AND SOCIAL CHANGE 121 (1977)
("The legal effort of the 1960s to extend the Fourteenth Amendment protections to public
accommodations was inextricably interwoven with the . . . 'sit-in' demonstrations .... ");
Robert M. Cover, Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HAlv. L. REV. 4, 47 (1983). During
the early 1960s a common tactic for challenging the widespread practice of refusing service
to blacks in restaurants, lunch counters, hotels, and similar service establishments was the
"sit-in" demonstration. E.g., Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965) (demonstration outside
of a courthouse); Griffin v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 130 (1964) ("sit-in" demonstration in an
amusement park that refused to admit blacks); Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226 (1964) ("sit-
in" demonstration in a restaurant); Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347 (1964) ("sit-in"
demonstration at a drug store lunch counter that refused to serve blacks); Peterson v.
Greenville, 373 U.S. 244 (1963) ("sit-in" demonstration at a lunch-counter). The "sit-in"
demonstrations and the trials they produce were "the focus and cutting edge of the black
civil rights movement" in the early 1960s and succeeded in "arous[ing] support for passage
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964." GREENBERG, supra, at 121.
13. See, e.g., ANN FAGAN GINGER, THE RELEVANT LAWYERS (1972); Alvin Bronstein, Of-
fender Rights Litigation: Historical and Future Developments, in 2 PRISONER'S RIGHTS
SOURCEBOOK 5 (Ira P. Robbins ed., 1980); Alexander D. Brooks & Bruce J. Winick, Forward:
Mental Disability Law Comes Of Age, 39 RUTGERS L. REV. 235, 236-37 (1987); Rothman,
supra note 3; Patricia M. Wald & Paul R. Friedman, The Politics of Mental Health Advo-
cacy in the United States, 1 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 137 (1978).
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power, these lawyers are driven by a strong sense of justice that is
particularly offended when government officials visit tyranny upon
the powerless. These are the true heroes of the law. One such hero
was Leonard Boudin. During the outrages of the McCarthy era, 14
Boudin repeatedly stood up to the government when few lawyers
would, challenging its actions and defending its victims.' 5 During
the Vietnam War era, Boudin represented such war protesters as
Daniel Ellsberg"6 and Dr. Benjamin Spock."7 Boudin staunchly de-
fended our freedom to criticize the government, particularly in
times - during cold war and hot - of heightened government and
public sensitivity to criticism. When the government attempted to
hold hostage the freedom to travel by revoking passports or deny-
ing visas to those whose political views it found offensive, Boudin
rose to the challenge. He vindicated the right to travel and cham-
pioned the vision that national borders cannot keep out ideas.'"
These lawyers challenged governmental action and in the pro-
cess put the government on trial. They played a central role in
maintaining and preserving the rule of law. A Hitler could never
seize power in America and transform the legal system into an in-
strument of oppression because the independent bar in America
would never tolerate it. Whether functioning as a private attorney
general or as a champion of the accused, the independent lawyer in
America is a bulwark against tyranny and a guardian of our
liberty.
14. See, e.g., CEDRIC BELFRAGE, THE AMERICAN INQUISITION: 1945-1960 (1973); LILLIAN
HELLMAN, SCOUNDREL TIME (1976); PETER L. STEINBERG, THE GREAT "RED MENACE": UNITED
STATES PROSECUTION OF AMERICAN COMMUNISTS, 1947-1952 (1984); Walter Millis, The Rise
and Fall of the Radical Right, 44 VA. L. REV. 1291 (1958); Arthur E. Sutherlands, Jr., Free-
dom and Internal Security, 64 HARV. L. REV. 383 (1951); Winick, supra note 5, at 853-58.
15. See, e.g., Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301 (1965); Braden v. United States,
365 U.S. 431 (1961); Uphouse v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72 (1959); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116(1958); see Norman Dorsen et al., In Memory of Leonard B. Boudin, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1225
(1989).
16. United States v. Russo, No. 9373-WMB-CD (C.D. Cal. 1973); Belknap, supra note
4, at 11; James W. Ely, Jr., The Chicago Conspiracy Case, in AMERICAN POLITICAL TRIALS
263 (Michal R. Belknap ed., 1981). See generally PETER SCHRAG, TEST OF LOYALTY (1974).
17. See United States v. Spock, 416 F.2d 165 (1st Cir. 1969); JESSICA MITFORD, THE
TRIAL OF DR. SPOCK (1969); Ely, supra note 16, at 266.
18. See, e.g., Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222 (1984); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753
(1972); United States v. Laub, 385 U.S. 475 (1967); Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965); Ken-
nedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958); Al-
lende v. Shultz, 845 F.2d 1111 (1st Cir. 1988); Boudin v. Dulles, 235 F.2d 532 (D.C. Cir.
1956); Leonard B. Boudin, The Constitutional Right to Travel, 56 COLUM. L. REV. 47 (1956).
For an analysis of the significant administrative law and statutory construction contribu-
tions of Kent v. Dulles, see Winick, supra note 5, at 853-65.
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Ira J. Kurzban is a lawyer in this honored tradition. Over the
past fifteen years he has stood up to one of the most lawless of
governmental agencies - the Immigration and Naturalization Ser-
vice - in order to protect one of the most powerless and oppressed
groups in the history of our nation - the Haitian refugees. His
efforts stand as a potent example of the independent lawyer effec-
tively combatting governmental abuses that are all too common in
the administrative state.
Courts do not like agency action that is "blatantly lawless," 9
and when it is brought to their attention, they do not hesitate to
say so and to provide a measure of judicial remediation. The INS,
unfortunately, is not unique. Other agencies in our nation's history
have displayed arbitrariness verging on - if not surpassing -
"blatant lawlessness." Although the list is undoubtedly a lengthy
one, during my time at the bar the most glaring examples have
included the Selective Service System, the prison, the public
mental hospital, and the public school, in addition to the INS.
Opening up these areas of bureaucratic domain to public and
judicial scrutiny has had a salutary effect in decreasing the poten-
tial for abuse. The Selective Service System is a noteworthy exam-
ple. Prior to the Vietnam War and during its early years, Selective
Service local boards, those "little groups of neighbors" assigned to
make conscription decisions and apply Congress's stated policies
concerning who should be exempted or deferred from military ser-
vice,20 often freely applied their own conceptions of the law, follow-
ing arbitrary procedures and issuing induction orders to many
young men who demonstrated entitlement to exemption or
deferment.
With the rise of political opposition to the Vietnam War, more
and more young men refused induction and faced criminal prose-
cution. At an early point in the war, prosecutors easily obtained
convictions in refusal of induction cases: They simply introduced
into evidence the registrant's Selective Service file and asserted
19. See, e.g., Oestereich v. Selective Serv. Bd., 393 U.S. 233 (1968) (reading a statutory
limitation on judicial review of Selective Service Board "classification or processing" until
after induction into the military to permit pre-induction judicial review of local board
reclassification decisions that were "blatantly lawless"); see Bruce J. Winick, Direct Judicial
Review of the Actions of the Selective Service System, 69 MICH. L. REV. 55 (1970) (analyz-
ing the breadth of Oestereich's exception to the statutory ban on pre-induction judicial
review).
20. See JAMES W. DAVIS & KENNETH DOLBERAE, LITTLE GROUPS OF NEIGHBORS: THE SE-
LECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM (1968).
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that the file provided a "basis in fact" for the draft board's classifi-
cation decision, one of the most narrow standards of review known
to the law. In the late 1960s, however, an increasing number of
young law school graduates learned the intricacies of Selective Ser-
vice law and began to challenge draft board action, ultimately serv-
ing the checking value described in this essay. These young lawyers
began to educate the courts concerning the arbitrariness of draft
board action, and the courts paid attention. Whereas at the start
of the war, virtually all young men charged with refusal of induc-
tion were convicted, near the end, an increasingly higher percent-
age were acquitted. Federal district courts became more aware of
the many procedural and substantive irregularities in which the
boards engaged and less willing to tolerate these practices.
In an effort to combat the increasingly effective efforts of this
growing corps of draft lawyers, the military and its supporters in
Congress were able to obtain an amendment to the Selective Ser-
vice statute in 1967 that severely limited judicial review of Selec-
tive Service board action.21 Notwithstanding the clear language of
this congressional limitation on judicial review, the courts quickly
fashioned what became a broad exception to this limitation for
"blatantly lawless" agency action.22 Even though they had not
stopped the war with their legal efforts, these young draft lawyers
had succeeded in bringing the rule of law to the Selective Service
System. By exposing the egregious practices of the Selective Ser-
vice boards, by creating new paths to judicial review of these prac-
tices, and by educating the courts, these lawyers accomplished
needed reforms and reduced procedural irregularities.
Parallel developments also occurred in other areas of adminis-
trative law involving agencies with a similar penchant for irregular
and arbitrary action. When the Supreme Court in Tinker v. Des
Moines Independent School Board23 held that a ban on the wear-
ing of arm bands violated the First Amendment rights of public
school students who were protesting the Vietnam War, lawyers
pressed the constitutional rights of students in the courts, effecting
many needed reforms in other areas such as school suspension and
21. Military Selective Service Act of 1967, § 1(8)(c) (amending Universal Military
Training and Service Act § 10(b)(3), 50 U.S.C. § 460(b)(3) (Supp. IV, 1965-68)).
22. See, e.g., Oestereich v. Selective Serv. Bd, 393 U.S. 233 (1968); Foley v. Hershey,
409 F.2d 827 (7th Cir. 1969); see Winick, supra note 19.
23. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
[Vol. 23:3
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expulsion.24 Judicial recognition that the Constitution could not be
kept out of institutions in which the courts had previously applied
a "hands off" policy - such as prisons,'2 5 jails,' 6 and public facili-
ties for the mentally disabled17 - subjected those who ran such
institutions to the rule of law and curtailed arbitrary and irregular
practices.
Few governmental agencies have surpassed the record of INS
for irregular and arbitrary action. Just as in these other areas
where administrative abuses have flourished, lawyers such as Ira
Kurzban have played an important role by bringing abuses to pop-
ular and judicial attention, obtaining judicial relief to correct them,
and providing a deterrent to their continuation. This is the check-
ing value of the independent attorney in America.
Miami has traditionally been a civil liberties frontier. The
most visible and pressing civil liberties concern in recent years has
been the continued course of arbitrary and discriminatory action
by the INS in its treatment of the Haitian refugees. In the past
two decades, growing numbers have fled the oppressive political
conditions in Haiti in small wooden boats for the promised land of
Miami. Seeking refuge in this land of liberty, they were met, not
with the hospitality promised by our country's treaty commitments
under the United Nations Convention and Protocol Relating to the
Status of Refugees, 2 but with a series of blatantly lawless actions.
24. See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (requiring a procedural due process
hearing for school expulsion and suspension in excess of ten days).
25. See, e.g., Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974) (due process requires a hearing
for prison discipline resulting in depravation of good time credit); Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S.
480 (1980) (due process requires a hearing before prisoner can be transferred to mental
hospital); Bounds v. Crawford, 397 U.S. 936 (1970) (right of access to courts); Johnson v.
Avery 393 U.S. 483 (1969) (right of access to courts and to prison law libraries); Procunier v.
Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974) (First Amendment right of prisoners).
26. See, e.g., Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
27. See, e.g., Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982) (right of resident of mental
retardation facilities to freedom from unnecessary restraints and to reasonably safe condi-
tions); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979) (due process requires standard of proof by
clear and convincing evidence for civil commitment); O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563
(1975) (substantive due process limits on state's civil commitment power); Jackson v. Indi-
ana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972) (substantive due process and equal protection limits on commit-
ment of defendants found incompetent to stand trial).
28. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature July 28, 1951,
189 U.N.T.S. 137, art. 33. The essential terms of the Convention were expressly incorpo-
rated in the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature Jan. 1, 1967,
U.S.T. 6223, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 606 U.N.T.S. 267. The United States ratified the Protocol on
October 4, 1968. 114 Cong. Reg. 29607 (1968).
Under article 33 of the Convention and Protocol, signatory nations are obligated to
1992]
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INS officials repeatedly violated the right of the Haitians to fair
hearings and to be treated on a non-discriminatory basis.
This story was just unfolding when Ira Kurzban came to
Miami as a young lawyer. In a long series of cases that has spanned
the past fifteen years, Ira Kurzban challenged these practices. As
the most recent of these cases, Haitian Refugee Center, Inc. v.
Baker,29 sadly demonstrates, Ira's efforts have not always suc-
ceeded. The Haitians continue to be the victims of governmental
oppression. But Ira did succeed in an impressive number of cases,
and his victories not only put an end to a great many egregious
practices, but brought the plight of the Haitian refugees to the at-
tention of the world.
The INS is one of those low-visibility administrative agencies
whose actions usually evade public attention and judicial scrutiny.
Left unchecked, arbitrariness becomes a way of life. Through a se-
ries of dramatic law suits, Ira Kurzban has succeeded largely in
bringing the rule of law to the INS. Ira successfully attacked the
fairness of INS's perfunctory procedures to adjudicate asylum
claims of Haitian refugees in deportation proceedings,30 to deter-
mine excludability and entitlement to asylum in exclusion proceed-
ings,31 and to the award of the Special Agricultural Workers am-
nesty granted by Congress in IRCA 32
Ira more recently challenged the fairness of the procedures
used by INS aboard Coast Guard cutters and at Guantanamo Na-
val Base in conducting asylum screenings under the Haitian In-
terdiction Program. His efforts provoked a series of temporary re-
straining orders and preliminary injunctions issued by federal
refrain from returning to their country of origin refugees having a well-founded fear of per-
secution on account of race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership in a par-
ticular social group. A parallel statutory obligation is reflected in section 243(h) of the Im-
migration and Naturalization Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1990).
29. 949 F.2d 109 (11th Cir. 1991) and 953 F.2d 1498 (11th Cir. 1992), reh'g en banc
denied, 954 F.2d 731 (11th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1245 (1992).
30. Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Civiletti, 503 F. Supp. 442 (S.D. Fla. 1978), aff'd in part
and rev'd in part sub nom. Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Smith, 676 F.2d 1023 (5th Cir. Unit B
1982).
31. Louis v. Meissner, 530 F. Supp. 924 (S.D. Fla. 1981) (enjoining the holding of exclu-
sion hearings for a class of Haitian refugees transferred from Miami to remote areas of the
United States in violation of their statutory right to counsel at exclusion); Sannon v. United
States, 427 F. Supp. 1270 (S.D. Fla. 1977), vacated as moot, 631 F.2d 1247 (5th Cir. 1980)
(recognizing an alien's right to a hearing before an immigration judge in exclusion proceed-
ings on claims of political asylum).
32. McNary v. Haitian Refugee Ctr., 111 S. Ct. 888 (1991), aff'g, 872 F.2d 1555 (11th
Cir. 1989).
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district judge C. Clyde Atkins, but the district court ultimately was
reversed by a divided panel of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Ap-
peals.33 Although the Supreme Court's recent denial of certiorari in
this case" prevented review of the blatant procedural irregularities
found by the district court, Ira's efforts were not in vain. Embar-
rassed by the shabby practices which Ira had documented at the
district court hearings, the government changed its procedures, in-
creasing their fairness. Consequently, some 5,000 of the refugees
were ultimately screened into the country for further determina-
tion of their asylum claims.
t Ira also taught the INS about the procedural requirements of
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), which mandates notice
and comment rule making procedures before an agency repeals an
existing rule or adopts a new one.35 To discourage the secret fash-
ioning of policy, notice and comment rule making attempts to open
up the policy making process to public scrutiny and participation,
thereby reducing arbitrariness and increasing the quality of poli-
cies ultimately adopted.36 Ira successfully asserted the APA when
INS changed the procedures for processing asylum claims in exclu-
sion proceedings;37 when INS revoked the work authorizations of
all Haitian refugees whose asylum claims were then pending;38 and
when INS discontinued its long-standing practice of releasing ex-
cludable aliens until determination of their admission claims,
adopting instead a new policy mandating detention.3 9
The Haitian refugees were repeatedly subjected to special
treatment by INS - treatment accorded no other group of aliens,
and Ira's law suits challenged this discriminatory conduct. One
case, Jean v. Nelson, provoked world-wide concern. INS had set
33. Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Baker, 789 F. Supp. 1552 and 1579 (S.D. Fla. 1991), rev'd,
949 F.2d 109 (11th Cir. 1991) and 953 F.2d 1498 (11th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
1245 (1992).
34. 112 S. Ct. 1245 (1992).
35. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c).
36. Jean v. Nelson, 544 F. Supp. 973, 1002-03 (S.D. Fla. 1982), aff'd in part and rev'd
in part, 711 F.2d 1455 (11th Cir. 1983), dismissed in part, rev'd in part and remanded, 727
F.2d 957 (11th Cir. 1984) (en banc), aff'd in part, vacated in part and remanded, 472 U.S.
846 (1985).
37. Sannon v. United States, 427 F. Supp. 1270 (S.D. Fla. 1977), vacated as moot, 631
F.2d 1247 (5th Cir. 1980).
38. National Council of Churches v. Egan, No. 79-2959-CIV-WMH (S.D. Fla. 1979).
39. Jean v. Nelson, 532 F. Supp. 881, 544 F. Supp. 973 & 1004 (S.D. Fla. 1982), aff'd in
part and rev'd in part, 711 F.2d 1455 (11th Cir. 1983), dismissed in part, rev'd in part and
remanded, 727 F.2d 957 (11th Cir. 1984) (en banc), aff'd in part, vacated in part and re-
manded, 472 U.S. 846 (1985).
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up a series of barbed wire detention camps and used them primar-
ily for Haitian boat people, while releasing refugees of other na-
tionalities into the community. Although Judge Eugene P. Spell-
man invalidated the new detention policy for violation of the APA
notice-and-comment rule making requirements, he rejected the
discrimination claim on the basis that although the evidence had
shown a discriminatory pattern, the plaintiffs had failed to demon-
strate the necessary discriminatory intent.40 In a detailed and thor-
ough opinion authored by Judge Arleen Kravitch, a unanimous
panel of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, finding
Judge Spellman's determination of non-discrimination to be
clearly erroneous. After reviewing the extensive record compiled in
the seven-week trial, the circuit court found that the United States
government had engaged in invidious discrimination against the
Haitians based on their race and national origin in violation of the
Constitution."' It was a historic opinion. Although judicial findings
of discrimination by states and localities are not rare, seldom has
the federal government itself been found guilty of invidious
discrimination.
Subsequently, however, the Eleventh Circuit granted en banc
review of the panel's decision and vacated its finding of discrimina-
tion, not on the basis that it was factually incorrect, but rather on
the ground that excludable aliens could not assert constitutional
rights. 2 The stage was set for a landmark decision when the Su-
preme Court granted Ira's petition for certiorari to consider the
significant and unresolved issue of the applicability of the Consti-
tution to excludable aliens. The Court, however, ultimately dodged
the question, finding it unnecessary to reach the constitutional is-
sue in light of the Court's holding in the case that INS could not
discriminate based on nationality when the relevant statute and
regulations did not authorize differential treatment."3 Although Ira
was not successful in establishing that the Constitution forbids the
kind of discrimination that the Haitians had received, he did es-
tablish the important principle that such discrimination may not
be engaged in by the agency when the statute and regulations are
neutral on their face.
Not only do Ira's many victories on behalf of the Haitian refu-
40. Jean, 544 F. Supp. at 1002.
41. Jean, 711 F.2d 1455 (11th Cir. 1983).
42. Jean, 727 F.2d 957 (11th Cir. 1984) (en banc).
43. Jean, 472 U.S. 846 (1985).
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gees serve as vivid examples of the checking value of the indepen-
dent lawyer in preventing governmental abuses, but his litigation
efforts have fostered structural legal changes that facilitate access
for aliens to lawyers and to judicial review in order to challenge
INS action. In so doing, Ira created a lasting legacy for future gen-
erations of lawyers continuing in this historic tradition.
The immigration statutes contain a variety of provisions limit-
ing judicial review of INS action. For example, the statute limits
judicial review in deportation cases to the court of appeals and in
exclusion cases to habeas proceedings in the district court. Simi-
larly, the statute restricts the review of denials of Special Agricul-
tural Workers status to a limited review proceeding in the court of
appeals. In a series of cases, Ira forged an exception to these re-
strictive review provisions that allows district courts to consider
class actions that challenge the fairness of procedures used in the
determination of these various statuses."" His significant Supreme
Court victory in McNary v. Haitian Refugee Center45 vindicated
the principle of judicial review of agency action in general, and
strongly endorsed the presumption in favor of such review. Ira has
thus paved the way to the courts, not only for aliens, but for all
persons aggrieved by agency action. The judicial review thereby
made available not only corrects abuses of power by governmental
agencies, but also acts as a significant deterrent to such abuses.
In addition to broadening access to judicial review, Ira cham-
pioned the right of aliens to have access to counsel. When the gov-
ernment acts unlawfully, and then compounds its illegality by iso-
lating its victims and preventing them from having access to
counsel, the checking value of the independent lawyer is frus-
44. McNary v. Haitian Refugee Ctr., 111 S. Ct. 888 (1991) (permitting judicial review of
the fairness of procedures used in determining SAW status); Jean v. Nelson, 544 F. Supp.
973 & 1004, 532 F. Supp. 881 (S.D. Fla. 1982), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 711 F.2d 1455
(11th Cir. 1983), aff'd in part, vacated in part and remanded, 727 F.2d 957 (11th Cir. 1984)
(en banc), dismissed in part, rev'd in part and remanded, 472 U.S. 846 (1985) (permitting
judicial review of the detention of excludable aliens); Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Smith, 676 F.
2d 1023 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982) (permitting judicial review of fairness of procedures used in
deportation); Louis v. Nelson, 530 F. Supp. 924 (S.D. Fla. (1981) (authorizing a class action
challenge to procedural irregularities in exclusion proceedings and granting a preliminary
injunction); Velasquez v. Nelson, No. 86-1262-CIV-RYSKAMP (S.D. Fla. 1986) (class action
resulting in a preliminary injunction which cancelled a change of venue of exclusion hear-
ings from the Krome Detention Center in Miami to the Oakdale Detention Center in Louisi-
ana based on lack of proper notice); National Council of Churches v. Egan, No. 79-2959-
CIV-WMH (S.D. Fla. 1979) (permitting judicial review of an across-the-board revocation of
work authorizations of excludable Haitians).
45. 111 S. Ct. 888 (1991).
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trated. In 1981, INS attempted to conduct exclusion proceedings
behind closed doors in an immigration courthouse in Miami by de-
nying an attorney access to the Haitians. The attorney, who sought
to offer representation to the Haitians, was from the Haitian Refu-
gee Center, a political action organization established to provide
legal representation to the refugee community. INS subsequently
attempted to keep the Haitian Refugee Center's lawyers from hav-
ing access to the aliens held in detention at the Krome Detention
facility in Miami. Ira challenged these actions and obtained an im-
portant First Amendment victory establishing the right of attor-
neys for the Haitian Refugee Center to have access to their clients
and potential clients."' Ira's recent effort to extend this principle to
allow attorneys access to interdicted Haitian aliens held on the
high seas in Coast Guard cutters and at a tent city erected at the
Guantanamo Naval Base in Cuba was rebuffed by a divided panel
of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals.4 However, future courts
more faithful to the tradition of the First Amendment and to the
importance of the checking value of the independent American
lawyer undoubtedly will protect the reasonable access of attorneys
for such political action organizations to interview and represent
those in government custody.
Ira's pioneering use of the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA)
not only increased access of all individuals and organizations to at-
torneys, but also increased the incentives for private lawyers to
provide such access. In 1981 Congress passed the EAJA to promote
access to counsel by individuals and organizations aggrieved by
agency action. 48 By allowing court-awarded attorneys' fees in cases
in which parties prevailing against the federal government could
demonstrate that an agency's position was not "substantially justi-
fied," 9 Congress attempted to deter the agencies from acting law-
lessly and taking unreasonable positions in litigation. By creating
the incentive of attorneys' fees, Congress also attempted to en-
courage more private lawyers to act as "private attorneys general"
46. Jean v. Nelson, 727 F.2d at 983. See also Louis v. Meissner, 530 F. Supp. 924 (S.D.
Fla. 1981); Velasquez v. Nelson, No. 86-1262-CIV-RYSKAMP (S.D. Fla. 1986).
47. Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc. v. Baker, 953 F.2d 1498 (11th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 112
S. Ct. 1245 (1992). Judge Hatchett's strong dissent on the access issue displays a greater
sensitivity to the First Amendment values at stake. See 953 F.2d at 1515-24 (Hatchett, J.,
dissenting).
48. Equal Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 96-481, 94 Stat. 2321, 2325-30 (codified as
amended at 5 U.S.C. § 504 (1982), 28 U.S.C. 2412 (1982)).
49. Id. § 504.
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in such cases, thereby providing equal access to the courts for peo-
ple and organizations without wealth. Ira's efforts on behalf of the
Haitian refugees not only have been the subject of several EAJA
awards, but his successful defense of fee awards on appeal has re-
sulted in important judicial elaborations of EAJA that have in-
creased the availability of fees and costs.5 0 Ira's unanimous Su-
preme Court victory in Commissioner v. Jean,51 broadening the
availability of "fees on fees" (the award of attorneys' fees for work
performed in litigating their availability), has special significance
for the checking value of the independent lawyer. By paving the
way for attorneys' fees, and for "fees on fees," Ira's efforts have
institutionalized the role of the private attorney in fighting against
government abuse and have provided a new incentive for many
present and future lawyers to join him in playing this historic role.
It is thus entirely fitting that the Inter-American Law Review
bestows its "Lawyer of the Americas" honor upon Ira J. Kurzban.
Like Andrew Hamilton, Clarence Darrow, Leonard Boudin, and
many brave and energetic lawyers past and present, Ira Kurzban
exemplifies the importance of the checking value of the American
lawyer, a role that plays an important part in preserving our liber-
ties and in achieving our democratic aspirations. Not only do Ira's
efforts stand as a model of lawyering in the public interest, but by
broadening access to counsel and to courts, they facilitate the con-
tinuation of this honored tradition.
50. Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Civiletti, 503 F. Supp. 442 (S.D. Fla. 1980), aff'd as modi-
fied sub nom. Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Smith, 676 F.2d 1023 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982); Jean v.
Nelson, 646 F. Supp. 1300 (S.D. Fla. 1986), aff'd in part, vacated and remanded, 863 F.2d
759 (11th Cir. 1988), aff'd sub nom., Commissioner v. Jean, 496 U.S. 154 (1990).
51. 496 U.S. 154 (1990).
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